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Report of the Board of Auditors on the audit of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit herewith to the Security Council the report of the Board of Auditors on the audit of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010.

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Letters of transmittal

31 March 2011

In accordance with financial regulation 6.5, I have the honour to submit the accounts of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010, which I hereby approve. The financial statements have been completed and certified as correct by the Controller.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

Mr. Liu Jiayi
Chair of the Board of Auditors
United Nations
New York

12 July 2011

I have the honour to present to you the audited financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the financial period 15 to 31 December 2010 and the report of the United Nations Board of Auditors thereon.

(*Signed*) **Liu** Jiayi
Auditor-General of the People's Republic of China
Chair, United Nations Board of Auditors

The President of the Security Council
of the United Nations
New York

Report of the Board of Auditors on the audit of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010

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I. Report of the Board of Auditors (audit opinion)

Report on the financial statements

We have audited the accompanying financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), comprising the statement of income and expenditure and changes in reserves and fund balances (statement I), the statement of assets, liabilities and reserves and fund balances as at 31 December 2010 (statement II) and the cash flow statement for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010 (statement III), as well as the notes to the financial statements.

Management's responsibility for the financial statements

The Secretary-General is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in accordance with the United Nations system accounting standards and for such internal control as he deems is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor's responsibility

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing. Those standards require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.

An audit includes performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. The procedures selected depend on the auditor's judgement, including the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to fraud or error. In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the entity's preparation and fair presentation of the financial statements in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control. An audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the financial statements.

We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our audit opinion.

Opinion

In our opinion, the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the United Nations escrow account as at 31 December 2010 and its financial performance and cash flows for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010 in accordance with the United Nations system accounting standards.

Report on other legal and regulatory requirements

Furthermore, in our opinion, the transactions of the United Nations escrow account that have come to our notice, or which we have tested as part of our audit,

have in all significant respects been in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations and legislative authority.

In accordance with article VII of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, we have also issued a long-form report on our audit of the United Nations escrow account.

(*Signed*) **Liu** Jiayi
Auditor-General of the People's Republic of China
Chair of the United Nations Board of Auditors
(Lead Auditor)

(*Signed*) Terence **Nombembe**
Auditor-General of the Republic of South Africa

(*Signed*) Amyas **Morse**
Comptroller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

12 July 2011

II. Report of the Board of Auditors (long-form report)

Summary

The Board of Auditors has audited the financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010. The audit was carried out through a review of the financial transactions covering the establishment of the account.

Audit opinion

The Board issued an unmodified audit opinion on the financial statements for the period under review, as reflected in section I.

Financial overview

The escrow account was established on 15 December 2010 by the Security Council in its resolution 1958 (2010). Pursuant to the resolution, the Administration transferred $151 million from the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts to a new escrow account, including $20 million in the administration fund and $131 million in the indemnification reserve fund.

As at 31 December 2010, total income (from interest) amounted to $6,000, while no expenditure was incurred. The total cash balance was $151 million, consisting of $20 million in the administration fund and $131 million in the indemnification reserve fund.

Reserves for end-of-service and post-retirement benefits

The financial statements do not reflect the end-of-service and post-retirement benefits for the staff fully involved in the United Nations escrow account, amounting to $1.757 million, as a separate line item. Instead, they were included in the account's operating reserve. In the Board's view, the separate disclosure will increase clarity and transparency.

Contingent liabilities

In line with the terms of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), three letters of credit amounting to $4.2 million, which were cancelled but identified to have claims of delivery made prior to the expiry, were disclosed as contingent liabilities in the notes to the financial statements. The Secretary-General, in his letters to the President of the Security Council from 2008 to 2010, indicated that the three letters of credit should be treated in the same manner as those letters of credit with claims of delivery still outstanding, hence their recording as contingent liabilities.

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), the Secretary-General was requested to take all actions necessary to terminate all residual activities under the oil-for-food programme. As a result, the remaining 43 outstanding letters of credit with an aggregate value of $101 million were cancelled as at 31 December 2010. However, the claims of the 43 letters of credit were not disclosed as contingent liabilities in the notes to the financial statements. The Board is of the view that there should have been consistency of accounting treatment for cancelled letters of credit for which claims still exist.

The Administration has since taken measures to address the findings noted during this audit, and corresponding changes are reflected in the revised financial statements.

A. Background

1. United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts were established under the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 706 (1991), 778 (1992), 986 (1995), 1284 (1999), 1483 (2003) and 1762 (2007). In 2010, the liquidation of the oil-for-food programme was in its seventh year, following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1483 (2003).

2. The Security Council, in its resolution 1958 (2010), authorized the Secretary-General to establish a new escrow account for the purposes detailed below, to appoint independent and certified public accountants to audit it and to keep the Government of Iraq fully informed.

3. The Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to transfer $20 million and up to $131 million from the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts to the new escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) and to retain the total of $151 million in the latter account until 31 December 2016. The amount of $20 million was exclusively for United Nations expenses relating to the orderly termination of the residual activities of the oil-for-food programme, including the Organization's support to Member State investigations and proceedings related to the programme and the expenses of the Office of the High-level Coordinator. The amount of up to $131 million was reserved for the purpose of providing indemnification to the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors for a period of six years with regard to all activities in connection with the programme since its inception. As the new escrow account expires on 31 December 2016, all the remaining funds must be transferred to the Government of Iraq by 31 December 2016, unless otherwise authorized by the Security Council.

4. In order to fully and effectively implement resolution 1958 (2010), the Security Council further authorized the Secretary-General to enter into all necessary implementing arrangements or agreements as soon as possible with the Government of Iraq: (a) to provide appropriate indemnification to the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors, with regard to all oil-for-food programme activities since its inception; and (b) to provide for a waiver of any future claims the Government of Iraq might have against the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors with regard to all programme activities since its inception. The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report to it after entering into the said arrangements or agreements.

B. Mandate, scope and methodology

5. The Board of Auditors has audited the financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010. The audit was conducted in conformity with article VII of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations and the annex thereto, as well as the International Standards on Auditing. Those standards require that the Board comply with ethical requirements and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance as to whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement.

6. The audit was conducted primarily to enable the Board to form an opinion as to whether the financial statements presented fairly the financial position of the escrow account as at 31 December 2010 and the results of operations and cash flows for the period then ended, in accordance with the United Nations system accounting standards. This included an assessment as to whether the expenditures recorded in the financial statements had been incurred for the purposes approved by the governing bodies and whether income and expenditures had been properly classified and recorded in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules. The audit included a general review of financial systems and internal controls and an examination of the accounting records and other supporting evidence to the extent that the Board considered necessary to form an opinion on the financial statements.

7. The audit was performed together with the audit on the financial statements of the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts established under the provisions of Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 706 (1991), 778 (1992), 986 (1995), 1284 (1999), 1483 (2003) and 1762 (2007) for the 12-month period ended 31 December 2010 of the biennium 2010-2011. The Board issued a separate report on the audit of the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts (see S/2011/479).

8. The present report covers matters that, in the opinion of the Board, should be brought to the attention to the Security Council. The Board's observations and conclusions were discussed with the Administration, whose views have been appropriately addressed in the report.

C. Findings and recommendations

1. Financial overview

9. As at 31 December 2010, total income (from interest) amounted to $6,000, while no expenditure was incurred. The total cash balance was $151 million, comprising $20 million in the administration fund and $131 million in the indemnification reserve fund. These funds were all transferred from the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010).

2. Indemnification reserve fund

10. The Administration, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), transferred $131 million as the indemnification reserve fund from the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts to the new escrow account. However, the Administration did not provide the Board with a breakdown of the figure and how the Administration arrived at it.

11. The Administration explained that it had held several meetings with the permanent members of the Security Council in 2010 and indicated the Organization's potential areas of exposure relating to the closure of the oil-for-food programme. However, owing to the highly confidential nature of the matter and the ongoing negotiations with the relevant stakeholders, the Administration considered that it would, at this stage, be against the best interest of the Organization to provide detailed information about the breakdown of the $131 million and how the figure was arrived at.

12. The Board recognizes that the amount of $131 million is within the limit allowed by the Security Council resolution and accurately discloses the transfer from the reserve of the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts. Although this does not affect the fair presentation of the financial statements, the Board is of the view that the breakdown of this figure and how the Administration arrived at it would have formed the basis for the Board to confirm the reasonableness of the information provided to the Security Council by the Administration. The Board will review this matter in the context of the next audit of the new escrow account.

3. Reserves for end-of-service and post-retirement benefits

13. The Board noted that, unlike the past practice in the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts, the end-of-service and post-retirement benefits of $1.757 million were not recognized as a separate line item but were included in the operating reserves in the financial statements of the new escrow account as at 31 December 2010.

14. The Board also noted that the explanations of the end-of-service and post-retirement benefits in different notes to the financial statements were not consistent. In particular, the information relative to the end-of-service and post-retirement benefits, including the composition, actuarial process and major assumptions as well as associated changes, was not disclosed in the notes.

15. Subsequently, the Administration made the necessary changes and revised the financial statements.

4. Contingent liabilities

16. Under the terms of Security Council resolution 1483 (2003), as part of the liquidation process, all claims and disputes involving the United Nations or its agencies with third parties in carrying out the activities of the oil-for-food programme were to be transferred to the Authority, which has since been succeeded by the Government of Iraq. Accordingly, three letters of credit in the amount of $4.2 million, which were cancelled but had been identified as having claims of delivery made prior to their expiry, were disclosed as contingent liabilities in the notes to the financial statements.

17. The Board noted that in accordance with Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), 43 outstanding letters of credit with an aggregate value of $101 million had been cancelled as at 31 December 2010, but the claims of those letters had not been disclosed as contingent liabilities in the notes to the financial statements.

18. In his letters to the President of the Security Council dated 25 July 2008 (S/2008/492), 1 May 2009 (S/2009/230) and 8 December 2010 (S/2010/619), the Secretary-General indicated that whatever option might be selected by the Security Council for concluding all outstanding issues under the oil-for-food programme, the three letters of credit that had been cancelled but to which the beneficiaries had made claims of delivery prior to the expiration date should be treated in the same manner as those letters of credit with claims of delivery still outstanding.

19. The Board is of the view that the nature of the 43 letters of credit is very similar to that of the other 3, as they may still expose the United Nations to potential risk of claims, as confirmed by the above statements. They should therefore be treated in the same manner. Should the oil-for-food programme ultimately be

required to absorb all or a portion of those claims, they will be met from the new escrow account.

20. The Administration subsequently made the necessary changes and revised the financial statements accordingly.

D. Disclosures by management

1. Write-off of losses of cash, receivables and property

21. As required by rules 106.8 and 106.9 of the Financial Regulations and Rules, the Administration informed the Board that there had been no write-off of cash, receivables or properties during the period from 15 to 31 December 2010.

2. Ex gratia payments

22. As required by financial rule 105.12, the Administration reported that there had been no ex gratia payments during the period.

3. Cases of fraud and presumptive fraud

23. The Administration informed the Board that there were no cases of fraud or presumptive fraud relating to the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period under review.

E. Acknowledgement

24. The Board wishes to express its appreciation for the cooperation and assistance extended to its staff by the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Management, the Assistant Secretary-General and Controller, and their staff members.

(*Signed*) **Liu** Jiayi
Auditor-General of the People's Republic of China
Chair of the United Nations Board of Auditors
(Lead Auditor)

(*Signed*) Terence **Nombembe**
Auditor-General of the Republic of South Africa

(*Signed*) Amyas **Morse**
Comptroller and Auditor-General of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

12 July 2011

III. Certification of the financial statements

1. The financial statements for the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010 have been prepared in accordance with financial rule 106.10.

2. The summary of significant accounting policies applied in the preparation of these statements is included as notes to the financial statements. The notes provide additional information and clarifications for the financial activities related to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) undertaken by the Organization during the period covered by these statements, for which the Secretary-General has administrative responsibility.

3. I certify that the appended financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), numbered I to III, are correct.

(*Signed*) Jun **Yamazaki**
Assistant Secretary-General, Controller

29 March 2011

IV. Financial statements for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010

Statement I

United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)[a]

Statement of income and expenditure and changes in reserves and fund balances for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Administration	*Indemnification reserve*	*Total 2010*
Income			
Interest income	1	5	6
Total income	**1**	**5**	**6**
Expenditure	—	—	—
Excess (shortfall) of income over expenditure	**1**	**5**	**6**
Transfers from other funds[b]	20 000	131 000	151 000
Reserves and fund balances, beginning of period	—	—	—
Reserves and fund balances, end of period	**20 001**	**131 005**	**151 006**

[a] See note 1.

[b] Represents transfers from the United Nations escrow (Iraq) accounts as authorized by Security Council resolution 1958 (2010).

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

Statement II

United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)[a]

Statement of assets, liabilities and reserves and fund balances as at 31 December 2010

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Administration	*Indemnification reserve*	*Total 2010*
Assets			
Cash and term deposits	45	45	90
Cash pool	19 956[b]	130 960[c]	150 916
Total assets	**20 001**	**131 005**	**151 006**
Liabilities	—	—	—
Reserves and fund balances			
Operating reserves[d]	1 757	—	1 757
Cumulative surplus	18 244	131 005	149 249
Total reserves and fund balances	**20 001**	**131 005**	**151 006**

[a] See note 1.

[b] Represents the share of the United Nations Headquarters cash pool, comprising cash and term deposits of $2,879,573, short-term investments of $4,690,372 (market value $4,735,575), long-term investments of $12,293,350 (market value $12,317,509) and accrued interest receivable of $92,233.

[c] Represents the share of the United Nations Headquarters cash pool, comprising cash and term deposits of $18,897,424, short-term investments of $30,780,931 (market value $31,077,578), long-term investment of $80,676,065 (market value $80,834,613) and accrued interest receivable of $605,289.

[d] Represents reserves for end-of-service and post-retirement benefits. See note 4.

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

Statement III

United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010)[a]

Statement of cash flows for the period from 15 to 31 December 2010

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Administration	*Indemnification reserve*	*Total 2010*
Cash flows from operating activities			
Net excess (shortfall) of income over expenditure (statement I)	1	5	6
Less: Interest income	(1)	(5)	(6)
Net cash from operating activities	—	—	—
Cash flows from investing activities			
Interest income	1	5	6
Net cash from investing activities	**1**	**5**	**6**
Cash flows from financing activities			
Transfers from other funds	20 000	131 000	151 000
Net cash from financing activities	**20 000**	**131 000**	**151 000**
Net increase in cash and term deposits and cash pool	**20 001**	**131 005**	**151 006**
Cash and term deposits and cash pool, beginning of period	—	—	—
Cash and term deposits and cash pool, end of period	**20 001**	**131 005**	**151 006**

[a] See note 1.

The accompanying notes are an integral part of the financial statements.

Notes to the financial statements

Note 1
United Nations escrow account established under the provisions of Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) (statements I, II and III)

(a) The Security Council, in its resolution 1958 (2010) of 15 December 2010, requested the Secretary-General to take all actions necessary to terminate all residual activities of the oil-for-food programme. The Council authorized the Secretary-General to establish an escrow account and retain $20 million in it until 31 December 2016 for the expenses related to the orderly termination of the residual activities, including the Organization's support to Member State investigations and Member State proceedings related to the programme, as well as the expenses of the Office of the High-level Coordinator created pursuant to its resolution 1284 (1999).

(b) In the same resolution, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to retain in the escrow account up to $131 million for the purpose of providing indemnification to the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors with regard to all activities in connection with the oil-for-food programme since its inception, for a period of six years.

(c) Also in the same resolution, the Security Council requested that all funds remaining in the escrow account after six years be transferred to the Government of Iraq by 31 December 2016.

(d) These are the first financial statements of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010). The activities described in (a) and (b) above are shown in the "Administration" and "Indemnification reserve" columns, respectively, in the financial statements.

Note 2
Summary of significant accounting and financial reporting policies of the United Nations

(a) The accounts of the United Nations are maintained in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly, the rules formulated by the Secretary-General as required under the Regulations and administrative instructions issued by the Under-Secretary-General for Management or the Controller. They also take fully into account the United Nations system accounting standards, as adopted by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). The Organization follows International Accounting Standard 1, "presentation of financial statements", on the disclosure of accounting policies, as modified and adopted by CEB, as shown below:

(i) Going concern, consistency and accrual are fundamental accounting assumptions. Where fundamental accounting assumptions are followed in financial statements, disclosure of such assumptions is not required. If a fundamental accounting assumption is not followed, that fact should be disclosed together with the reasons;

(ii) Prudence, substance over form, and materiality should govern the selection and application of accounting policies;

(iii) Financial statements should include clear and concise disclosure of all significant accounting policies that have been used;

(iv) The disclosure of the significant accounting policies used should be an integral part of the financial statements. These policies should normally be disclosed in one place;

(v) Financial statements should show comparative figures for the corresponding period of the preceding financial period;

(vi) A change in an accounting policy that has a material effect in the current period or may have a material effect in subsequent periods should be disclosed together with the reasons. The effect of the change should, if material, be disclosed and quantified.

(b) The Organization's accounts are maintained on a fund accounting basis. Separate funds for general or special purposes may be established by the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the Secretary-General. Each fund is maintained as a distinct financial and accounting entity with a separate self-balancing double-entry group of accounts. Separate financial statements are prepared for each fund or for a group of funds of the same nature.

(c) The financial period of the Organization is a biennium and consists of two consecutive calendar years for all funds other than peacekeeping accounts, which are reported on a fiscal year basis covering the period from 1 July to 30 June.

(d) Generally, income, expenditure, assets and liabilities are recognized on the accrual basis of accounting.

(e) The accounts of the Organization are presented in United States dollars. Accounts maintained in other currencies are translated into United States dollars at the time of the transactions at rates of exchange established by the United Nations. In respect of such currencies, the financial statements shall reflect the cash, investments, unpaid pledges and current accounts receivable and payable in currencies other than the United States dollar, translated at the applicable United Nations rates of exchange in effect at the date of the statements. In the event that the application of actual exchange rates at the date of the statements would provide a valuation materially different from the application of the Organization's rates of exchange for the last month of the financial period, a footnote will be provided quantifying the difference.

(f) The Organization's financial statements are prepared on the historical cost basis of accounting and are not adjusted to reflect the effects of changing prices for goods and services.

(g) The cash flow summary statement is based on the indirect method of cash flows as referred to in the United Nations system accounting standards.

(h) The Organization's financial statements are presented in accordance with the ongoing recommendations of the Task Force on Accounting Standards to the High-level Committee on Management of CEB.

(i) Income:

(i) Voluntary contributions from Member States or other donors are recorded as income on the basis of a written commitment to pay monetary contributions

at specified times within the current financial period. Voluntary contributions made in the form of services and supplies that are acceptable to the Secretary-General are credited to income or noted in the financial statements;

(ii) Income received under inter-organizational arrangements represents allocations of funding from agencies to enable the Organization to administer projects or other programmes on their behalf;

(iii) Allocations from other funds represent monies appropriated or designated from one fund for transfer to and disbursement from another fund;

(iv) Income for services rendered include amounts charged for salaries of staff members and other costs which are attributable to providing technical and administrative support to other organizations;

(v) Interest income includes all interest earned on deposits in various bank accounts, investment income earned on marketable securities and other negotiable instruments and investment income earned in the cash pool. All realized losses and net unrealized losses on short-term investments are offset against investment income. Investment income and costs associated with the operation of investments in the cash pool are allocated to participating funds;

(vi) Miscellaneous income includes income from the rental of premises, the sale of used or surplus property, refunds of expenditures charged to prior periods, settlements of insurance claims, net gains on currency fluctuations other than for the current year's obligations, monies accepted for which no purpose was specified and other sundry income;

(vii) Income relating to future financial periods is not recognized in the current financial period and is recorded as deferred income as referred to in paragraph (l) (iii) below.

(j) Expenditure:

(i) Expenditures are incurred against authorized appropriations or commitment authorities. Total expenditures reported include unliquidated obligations and disbursements. Expenditures also include currency exchange adjustments arising from the evaluation of current-period obligations;

(ii) Expenditures incurred for non-expendable property are charged to the budget of the period when acquired and are not capitalized. Inventory of such non-expendable property is maintained at historical cost;

(iii) Expenditures for future financial periods are not charged to the current financial period and are recorded as deferred charges as referred to in paragraph (k) (v) below.

(k) Assets:

(i) Cash and term deposits represent funds in demand deposit accounts and interest-bearing bank deposits;

(ii) Investments include marketable securities and other negotiable instruments acquired by the Organization to produce income. Short-term investments are stated at the lower of cost or market value; long-term investments are stated at cost. Cost is defined as the nominal value plus or minus any unamortized

premium or discount. The market value of investments is disclosed in the footnotes in the financial statements;

(iii) Cash pools comprise participating funds' share of the cash and term deposits, short-term and long-term investments and accrual of investment income, all of which are managed in the cash pools. The investments in the cash pools are similar in nature. Short-term investments are stated at the lower of cost or market value; long-term investments are stated at cost. Cost is defined as the nominal value plus or minus any unamortized premium or discount. The share in cash pools is reported separately in each participating fund's statement and its composition and the market value of its investments are disclosed in footnotes in the individual statements;

(iv) Inter-fund balances reflect transactions between funds and are included in the amounts due to and from the United Nations General Fund. Inter-fund balances also reflect transactions directly with other escrow accounts and with the United Nations General Fund. Inter-fund balances are settled periodically, depending on the availability of cash resources;

(v) Deferred charges normally comprise expenditure items that are not properly chargeable in the current financial period. They will be charged as expenditure in a subsequent period. These expenditure items include commitments approved by the Controller for future financial periods in accordance with financial rule 106.7. Such commitments are normally restricted to administrative requirements of a continuing nature and to contracts or legal obligations where long lead times are required for delivery;

(vi) For purposes of the balance sheet statements only, those portions of education grant advances that are assumed to pertain to the scholastic years completed as at the date of the financial statement are shown as deferred charges. The full amounts of the advances are maintained as accounts receivable from staff members until the required proofs of entitlement are produced, at which time the budgetary accounts are charged and the advances settled;

(vii) Maintenance and repair of capital assets are charged against the appropriate budgetary accounts. Furniture, equipment, other non-expendable property and leasehold improvements are not included in the assets of the Organization. Such acquisitions are charged against budgetary accounts in the year of purchase. The value of non-expendable property is disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.

(l) Liabilities and reserves and fund balances:

(i) Operating reserves include reserves for end-of-service and post-retirement benefits. Operating reserves are included in the totals for reserves and fund balances shown in the financial statements;

(ii) Unliquidated obligations for future years are reported both as deferred charges and as unliquidated obligations;

(iii) Deferred income includes income received but not yet earned;

(iv) Commitments of the Organization relating to prior, current and future financial periods are shown as unliquidated obligations. Current-period

obligations remain valid for 12 months following the end of the financial period to which they relate;

(v) Contingent liabilities, if any, are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements;

(vi) The United Nations is a member organization participating in the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund, which was established by the General Assembly to provide retirement, death, disability and related benefits. The Fund is a funded defined benefit plan. The financial obligation of the Organization to the Fund consists of its mandated contribution at the rate established by the Assembly together with its share of any actuarial deficiency payments under article 26 of the Regulations of the Pension Fund. Such deficiency payments are payable only if and when the Assembly has invoked the provision of article 26, following determination that there is a requirement for deficiency payments based on an assessment of the actuarial sufficiency of the Fund as at the valuation date. As at the date of the current financial statement, the Assembly has not invoked this provision.

Note 3
Accounting policies for the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) (statements I, II and III)

The accounts of the United Nations escrow account established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010) are maintained on a biennial cycle consisting of two consecutive years, the first of which shall be an even-numbered year. Annual financial statements are prepared for purposes of reporting usage of funds and expenditures to the Council.

Note 4
Operating reserves

Operating reserves comprise estimated liabilities for end-of-service and post-retirement benefits for applicable staff members. The benefits comprise those for after-service health insurance coverage and commutation of unused vacation days. The liabilities for the end-of-service and post-retirement benefits are determined on the basis of an actuarial valuation, which was undertaken by an independent, qualified actuarial firm, and values determined as of 31 December 2009. The estimated liabilities as of 31 December 2010 are based on roll forwards of the 31 December 2009 values, and comprise $1,735,000 for after-service health insurance and $22,000 for unused vacation days, totalling $1,757,000. Operating reserves are included in the total for reserves and fund balances.

Note 5
Contingent liabilities

Further to Security Council resolution 1958 (2010), 43 letters of credit under the oil-for-food programme with outstanding claims of delivery in the amount of $101 million have been closed. In addition, three letters of credit in the amount of $4.5 million, which were cancelled, were identified to have claims of delivery made prior to their expiry. In respect thereof, and in accordance with Council resolution 1958 (2010), the Secretariat is entering into an agreement with the Government of Iraq under which the Government would provide appropriate indemnification to the

United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors with regard to all activities in connection with the programme since its inception and a waiver of any future claims that the Government of Iraq may have against the United Nations, its representatives, agents and independent contractors with regard to all activities in connection with the programme since its inception. With such an agreement, the United Nations is expected to be fully indemnified.

United Nations A/65/917–S/2011/481

General Assembly
Security Council

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2 August 2011

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General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 34
Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 1 August 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia dated 29 July 2011, concerning the submission for ratification of the so-called agreement between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia on cooperation and mutual assistance in the area of customs to the State Duma of Russia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Shalva **Tsiskarashvili**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

11-44126 (E) 040811

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 1 August 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia concerning the submission for ratification by the Russian President of the so-called agreement between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia on cooperation and mutual assistance in the area of customs to the State Duma

On 28 July 2011, the President of the Russian Federation, D. Medvedev, submitted for ratification the so-called agreement between the Russian Federation and Abkhazia on cooperation and mutual assistance in the area of customs to the State Duma.

It is noteworthy that neither present nor any other so-called "international agreements" concluded between the Russian Federation and Georgia's occupied regions have any legal effect or are applicable in international relations, as Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia represent integral parts of Georgia and do not have the status of subjects of international law. Hence, any relations which Russian authorities engage in with its proxy regimes in control of these territories are in violation of universally recognized norms and principles of international law as well as obligations of Russia undertaken in the international arena.

Moreover, in circumstances when the Georgian side expresses its readiness to resolve all outstanding issues between Georgia and Russia and is undertaking concrete efforts in this direction, the recent step by the President of the Russian Federation once again makes it clear that the Russian side is not willing to proceed with negotiations with Georgia in a constructive manner.

It should be underscored that the Russian side continuously tries to instil "new reality" created by Russia; however, neither Georgia nor the international community will legitimize or tolerate this reality.

Tbilisi, 29 July 2011

United Nations S/2011/482

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 29 July 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have it circulated as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Milan **Milanović**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

11-44005 (E) 030811

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 29 July 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

29 July 2011

Thank you for having met with me yesterday in New York. As I was not allowed to address the Security Council on the pressing issue that was the subject of our exchange of views, I would request that you circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Over the past four days, the situation in the Western Balkans has suddenly become less secure, less stable and less predictable. This is a direct consequence of the calculated decision by the ethnic-Albanian secessionist leadership to order an unprovoked armed incursion into North Kosovo. Their flagrant unilateralism must be clearly condemned.

On Monday night, 25 July 2011, Pristina's special operations militia, the so-called ROSU, was mobilized and equipped in full riot gear. Dozens of armoured personnel carriers transported hundreds of heavily armed men across the River Ibar. This blatantly violated the long-standing agreement between Pristina and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) that ROSU is not to be deployed in the North without the approval of EULEX, which operates in the territory under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

The most immediate aim of the operation was seizing the two checkpoints between North Kosovo and the rest of Serbia: Jarinje or Gate 1, and Brnjak or Gate 31.

The unsanctioned act of sending ethnic-Albanian paramilitaries from South Kosovo was perceived by the majority population of North Kosovo as an attempt to occupy the territory.

As ROSU crossed the River Ibar, its militiamen began to summarily arrest and beat a number of local Serb civilians. At Gate 31, they forcibly relieved the regular police unit composed mainly of Kosovo Serbs, detaining and disarming them. In response, locals put up roadblocks, as a way to defend themselves against the incursion. They did the same near Gate 1, which stopped ROSU from getting to that checkpoint.

The Government of the Republic of Serbia swiftly sent an official delegation to North Kosovo to help bring down the tensions. They began negotiations with the International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR) about restoring law and order in the province. By Tuesday morning, 26 July, the KFOR Commander, Major General Erhard Buhler of the German Army, had secured what we believed was an agreement with Pristina for ROSU to withdraw from North Kosovo.

After an initial pullback, however, the paramilitaries that had briefly occupied Gate 31 turned around, and started heading back to the checkpoint. Before they could reach their goal, they were met by practically the entire ethnic-Serb population of the town of Zubin Potok.

Regrettably, the resulting skirmishes led to a number of casualties, and at least one fatality.

Only after additional discussions between KFOR and the ethnic-Albanian authorities later in the same day did the ROSU militants begin to vacate the area. At the time, it appeared that calm and the status quo ante would be restored without further incident.

On Wednesday morning, 27 July, however, a number of so-called "Kosovo Customs" agents were transported by helicopter to Gates 1 and 31, apparently by KFOR. This inevitably raised tensions further.

Soon thereafter, everyone's attention was drawn to a highly regrettable incident at Gate 1, where masked individuals set fire to the checkpoint buildings.

The Serbian Government strongly condemns this act of extremism. We have already indicated our readiness to work with relevant stakeholders to uncover the perpetrators' identities and motives, as well as to determine whose instructions they were following.

Early Thursday morning, on 28 July, we had understood that provisional agreements had been struck between Belgrade and KFOR to keep ROSU and the so-called "Kosovo Customs" away from Gates 1 and 31.

Later that day, however, KFOR announced that it would implement the laws and decisions of the secessionist authorities in Pristina. This would place KFOR outside the status-neutral framework of the United Nations. Another worrisome development was that on the same day, KFOR declared Gates 1 and 31 restricted military areas, with rules of engagement that include the use of lethal force.

The negotiations with KFOR continued today, 29 July, and might continue into the weekend and beyond. We continue to believe that if they are conducted in good faith by all participants, the outcome will produce a return to the status quo ante.

Peace and security in our province of Kosovo is the responsibility of the Security Council. To understand what happened, and to determine who is responsible for the dramatic drop in stability throughout the territory that remains under the interim administration of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), we had felt it essential to address the Council.

Had we not been prevented from doing so, the Republic of Serbia would have emphasized our firm belief that the status quo ante must be reinstated.

We would also have underscored that those who keep actively encouraging Pristina's unilateralism will have to share with them the responsibility for the violence and fatalities that may take place in the province.

Moreover, we would have steadfastly maintained the view that those who destabilized North Kosovo through the actions of ROSU must be brought to account. Whoever gave the order to cross the River Ibar violated an agreement with EULEX — and must suffer the consequences.

The responsible stakeholders have to do whatever is necessary to ensure that no similar unilateral acts happen again.

We expect the Secretariat to chronicle extensively all aspects of the ROSU incursion in your next regular report to the Security Council, including the roles played by KFOR and EULEX.

The United Nations will also have to work more closely with KFOR to make sure that it operates fully within the status-neutral framework of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). Logistical assistance to the ethnic-Albanian separatists in North Kosovo must cease immediately.

In addition, KFOR and EULEX will have to closely monitor the situation in North Kosovo and be ready to respond forcefully to any further unilateralism by the authorities in Pristina. For this and a number of other reasons, KFOR must maintain its present troop levels, together with its exclusive static presence at all the Serbian holy sites they currently protect.

Lastly, the European Union will have to make it very clear to Pristina that disagreements at the negotiating table in Brussels cannot be resolved using physical means on the ground.

Several dangerous misconceptions have appeared in certain media over the past few days.

One centres on confusing cause with effect. The ROSU incursion is the cause. Whatever else happened on the ground in its wake is the effect.

It would also be a fallacy to equate the ROSU incursion with the unacceptable extremism of masked looters at Gate 1, whose actions were neither planned nor sanctioned by Serbia. In contrast, the ROSU incursion was an integral part of a strategy engineered at the most senior level in Pristina to forcibly impose an illegitimate and decisively unwanted regime upon the residents of North Kosovo.

A final erroneous belief is that the last round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina were postponed by Serbia. This is simply incorrect. We can bear no responsibility for the decision made by the European Union facilitator to impose a hiatus on the dialogue process.

On behalf of the Republic of Serbia, I respectfully ask you to do all that is in your power to make sure Pristina is not rewarded for unilateral and bellicose behaviour. To be able to move forward, the status quo ante must be restored, so that the dialogue can recommence and once more become the sole acceptable forum for overcoming disagreements.

As this letter makes clear, ample reasons had existed for a Security Council emergency meeting to have taken place. Regretfully, a choice was made by some of its members not to allow the voice of Serbia to be heard. Although you circulating this letter to the Council is no substitute, I nevertheless hope that this will, in a small way, contribute to overcoming this unhelpful impediment to our shared goal of reducing tensions in North Kosovo and contribute to improving stability throughout the Western Balkans.

(*Signed*) Vuk **Jeremić**

United Nations S/2011/483

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 August 2011

Original: English

Identical letters dated 1 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I write to express my grave concern regarding a serious incident that took place this morning in the area of the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon.

Today, at approximately 7 a.m. local time, a soldier from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) opened fire on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers situated south of the Blue Line. This unprovoked attack by the LAF is a clear violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

This is my second letter in the last two weeks dealing with Lebanese acts of provocation on the northern border. This incident is indicative of a clear pattern of provocative acts by the LAF, which has repeatedly shown itself trigger-happy and quick to open fire. In the past this has led to fatalities: on 3 August 2010, in another unprovoked attack, the LAF shot and killed reservist IDF Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Dov Harari. Miraculously, no casualities have been reported in this incident.

The IDF has fully cooperated with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) investigation into the incident and will continue to do so. At all times, the IDF remained south of the Blue Line, in compliance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). I would like to emphasize that the IDF responded in self-defence only after being fired upon, acting with maximum restraint.

We demand that the Government of Lebanon fully investigate the role of the LAF in causing this provocation. Moreover, we expect the Government of Lebanon to take all necessary measures to prevent such dangerous incidents from reoccurring in the future, and to ensure that the Blue Line is respected in its entirety.

We also call upon the international community to take action to prevent further provocations, conveying a clear message to the Government of Lebanon that such attacks are not only in violation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), but also carry with them a serious potential for escalation, threatening peace and stability in this area.

11-44112 (E) 040811

Please recycle

Israel remains determined to protect its borders, civilians and soldiers from unlawful provocations such as the one that took place this morning. Israel will continue to take great efforts to maintain regional peace and security and hopes that our neighbours will act in the same responsible way.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ron **Prosor**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2011/484

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 1 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to submit the report of the workshop for newly elected and present Security Council members, which was held on 18 and 19 November 2010 at the Arrowwood Conference Center (see annex). The present report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House rules under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

On the basis of the very positive feedback we have received each year from the participants, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland hopes that the report will not only help to familiarize newly elected members with the working methods and procedures of the Council, but also will contribute to a better understanding among the wider United Nations membership of the complexity of the Council's work.

I should be grateful, accordingly, if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Jarmo **Viinanen**
Ambassador
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

11-41507 (E) 020811

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 1 August 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

"Hitting the ground running": eighth annual workshop for newly elected members of the Security Council

18 and 19 November 2010
Arrowwood Conference Center
Rye Brook, New York

The Government of Finland, in cooperation with the International Peace Institute and the Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat, convened the eighth annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council on 18 and 19 November 2010.

The annual autumn workshops have served to help familiarize the newly elected members with the practice, procedure and working methods of the Security Council so that they are in a position to "hit the ground running" when they join the Council the following January. The series has also provided current members of the Council with an opportunity to reflect on their work in an informal setting.

This year, the opening evening featured remarks by Sir Mark Lyall Grant, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations and President of the Security Council for November 2010, and a keynote address by Sir Brian Urquhart, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs.

The full-day programme on 19 November included three round-table sessions that focused on the following themes:

I. State of the Council 2010: taking stock and looking ahead

II. Working methods and subsidiary bodies

III. Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2010

Opening remarks

Ambassador Lyall Grant thanked the outgoing members of the Security Council — Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey and Uganda — for their work over the previous two years, stating that they had made a significant contribution to the Council's work individually and collectively. He also welcomed the incoming members of the Council — Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal and South Africa — underscoring that the other Council members were looking forward to working with them. He also thanked Mr. Jarmo Viinanen, Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations, and the Finnish Government for once again sponsoring the "Hitting the ground running" workshop.

Ambassador Lyall Grant called the Security Council by far the most effective and adaptable of the United Nations bodies. He offered three observations about the Council's work that had struck him since he arrived in New York, in 2009.

First, he was surprised by the formulaic nature of much of the Security Council's work and by its rules of procedure that inhibit more spontaneous debate.

He commented that there may be a need for Council members to break out of their comfort zones and to move toward more informal and interactive consultations.

Secondly, he suggested that the Security Council does not always prioritize its time well. He noted that, during the United Kingdom's presidency in November 2010, of the 27 items on the calendar, 17 were of a routine nature dictated by the rhythm of normal events, five were in reaction to current developments and five were discretionary elements proposed by the United Kingdom. In his view, consideration should therefore be given to adapting the agenda so that it is not largely driven by routine mandate renewals and the calendar.

Thirdly, Ambassador Lyall Grant commented that he had noticed among members of the Security Council a desire to be more active in conflict prevention and resolution. He noted that this would require members to use more of their collective authority in those areas, as most of the Council's time was currently spent on conflict management.

Ambassador Lyall Grant highlighted what he considered to be some of the Security Council's successes in the preceding months, including on such issues as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and women, peace and security. On the other hand, he pointed out that the Council had been unable to make significant progress on long-running disputes related to peace in the Middle East, Cyprus, Western Sahara and Somalia.

He concluded by projecting that the Security Council was likely to be at least as busy in 2011 as it had been in 2010. While the Council had already invested significant time and effort on the Sudan, he added that this issue could well prove to be a significant short-term test for Council members in 2011.

Keynote speaker

Sir Brian Urquhart recalled that he had attended the first meeting of the Security Council, evoking the great expectations that accompanied its creation. At the time, it was anticipated that the Council's members would abandon their national instincts in order to concentrate entirely on world peace, addressing problems of war and peace and prosperity and economic depression in a way that had never been done before.

However, he underscored that the Security Council was soon challenged to meet the world's expectations during the Cold War. As a highly publicized institution, backed by the Super Powers, that aspired to deal with aggression and maintain peace and security in the world, the Council's effectiveness was handicapped by the 40-year nuclear stand-off between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, according to Sir Brian, the Security Council was not completely paralysed during the Cold War, managing to address some very serious crises. For example, it appointed a mediator in Palestine during the first Arab-Israeli War. It interceded to quell the tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. He added that, during those years, elected and permanent members alike frequently facilitated decisions on key issues before the Council.

According to Sir Brian, the Security Council became a productive place for improvisation during the Cold War. It had some substantial successes while

considering a large number of issues. It established a serious plan for the pacification of the Middle East and the settlement of the Kashmir issue, even though these plans have not yet been fulfilled. It also put in place the main elements of a settlement in Cyprus. The Council was also active in advancing the techniques of international cooperation to keep the peace, a particularly critical function during the Cold War because of the grave threat of nuclear war.

Sir Brian praised the performance of many of the Ambassadors who had served on the Security Council since its inception. He noted that their imaginative participation helped to transform the Council — founded on the false assumption that the Second World War allies would band together to keep the peace — into a body that was nonetheless very practical. Although not mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations, peacekeeping is one of the Council's great innovations, he observed. It has also developed various instruments for negotiating and investigating that have been important tools for maintaining international peace and security.

According to Sir Brian, 1986 marked a critical change in the dynamics of the Security Council. Relations among the permanent members began to improve, as they came together to address the war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. The following year, President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union called for greater use of the Council and its tools, such as preventive diplomacy, mediation and peacekeeping. By the end of the Cold War, according to Sir Brian, new global challenges began to emerge with which the Council was not accustomed to dealing. During the first Gulf War, the Council authorized the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the last great Chapter VII operation, in his view. While inter-State conflicts were becoming less frequent, complicated internal conflicts, characterized by insurrectionist movements, refugee situations and immense civilian hardship and misery, were proliferating.

In Sir Brian's assessment, the Security Council has adapted well to this new environment. It has repeatedly authorized peace operations within the borders of countries. Virtually all of the peace operations of the 1990s dealt with civil insurrections and inter-communal violence within States. Faced with new challenges to peace and security, the Council proceeded to innovate, to become increasingly active and to more broadly interpret the provisions of the Charter. While the Council has had its share of successes and failures over the years, in the end it seems to come through most of the time.

At this point, noted Sir Brian, it will be interesting to see how the Security Council handles emerging global problems that many believe to have security implications. Climate change, for example, could produce severe weather patterns that could lead to enormous migrations from flooded areas. Likewise, in the near future, more and more people could be living in water-stressed areas, where there simply is not enough water to sustain the population. Sir Brian expressed his hope that the Council will be able to address such emerging threats to peace and security.

In conclusion, Sir Brian underscored that the Security Council is a lively and constructive body in which decisions on relatively obscure matters can potentially build upon each other, thereby generating substantive progress over time. He reminded the incoming members that individual members of the Council can put forward ideas that lead to other ideas that will eventually lead to long-term

solutions, thus setting one more stone in the bridge from conflict to peace and security. That is the challenge and the promise of Council membership.

Session I
State of the Council 2010: taking stock and looking ahead

Moderator:

Ambassador Gérard Araud
Permanent Representative of France

Commentators:

Ambassador Ivan Barbalić
Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Ambassador Emmanuel Issoze-Ngondet
Permanent Representative of Gabon

Ambassador Wang Min
Deputy Permanent Representative of China

Session I provided an opportunity for members of the Security Council to reflect on the current state of the Council's work and to look ahead to the challenges that it will face in the coming months and years. The session focused on trends in the Council's agenda, workload and productivity; conflict prevention and peacebuilding; and its partnerships with regional organizations.

Trends in the agenda, workload and productivity of the Security Council

At the opening session, a number of participants noted that the Security Council continues to have a very heavy workload, notwithstanding the decline in recent years in the number of formal meetings, informal consultations, presidential statements and resolutions documented in the background paper prepared for the workshop by Professor Edward C. Luck. Indeed, there was broad agreement that the Council remains the most productive and dynamic body in the United Nations system. It was acknowledged, however, that this workload places a great burden on delegations. One participant noted that this is a consequence of the Council becoming a quasi-executive body for monitoring and managing crises related to an expanding set of cross-cutting issues. For example, the crisis in Guinea-Bissau required consideration of the issues of organized crime and drug trafficking. Similarly, the example of terrorism in the Sahel was also cited.

One speaker observed that the mandate of the Security Council is the same as it has always been. As is well known, the Charter entrusts the Council with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. This has not changed, but the issues the Council deals with are growing increasingly complex. The Council continues to work on inter-State conflicts, but now also deals with "fragile situations" within countries, which has led to debates about national sovereignty. The Council, according to this participant, is taking on cross-cutting issues, including human rights, humanitarian assistance, the rule of law, the protection of women and children, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and election-related disputes, and this engagement on such a wide range of issues partly explains

its heavy workload. The number of consultations necessary to address such issues has left little time for reflection or strategic planning. Another discussant expressed great disappointment over the lack of strategic debate, as "strategic doesn't mean stratospheric". The speaker called for strategic debates about Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where millions of lives are at stake.

Several participants commented on the need for more opportunities for strategic thinking. One noted that the Security Council is in a position to have a profound strategic impact on issues of peace and security. Council resolutions and presidential statements carry a strong political message that can give guidance to the international community in helping to coordinate various actors involved in conflict resolution. The Sudan is a prime example. However, in order to be more effective, the Council needs a more strategic perspective.

Another participant remarked that if it was possible for the Security Council to free up more time for long-term thinking, it ought to be looking beyond the horizon and asking what are the threats of the future that are not being discussed today. What will be the threats to international peace and security in 10 to 25 years? Should the members of the Council not be thinking about water shortages, bio-threats, pandemics and cyber threats? In essence, the Council needed to become more forward-looking and creative, to move beyond its "four walls" and to get out of its "comfort zone". Finally, the Council should become more informed about what the young people of the world want, since they are the majority in many parts of the world.

Another speaker agreed that the Security Council needed to break the cycle of rigidity and to adapt to a changing world. To properly consider these new issues, more flexibility and pragmatism are needed. One participant argued that the Council could be criticized as being fairly "academic" on this point. For example, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime appeared twice before the Council to present issues in a forceful manner, but the Council still has not reached the point of taking action in response. On a number of emerging transnational security threats, the more lively debates are taking place in other forums, away from the Council.

With regard to the Security Council's scope of action, another speaker agreed that it is still too narrowly focused on conflict management rather than on conflict resolution or prevention. Prevention should have a larger place on the Council's agenda. In this regard, however, the Council has handled the situation in the Sudan very well. In the future, the Council will have to address the security ramifications of climate change and other "new global challenges". This is a contentious issue that will inspire debates about sovereignty, but if the Council does not take up the issue of climate change, the Group of Twenty (G-20) or other bodies will. The question will be how to do so in a practical fashion. Another speaker agreed that climate change was an issue that the Council would have to address, but that first there is a need to define and analyse the aspects of the problem that were most relevant to peace and security. Only then would the Council be able to determine the best course of action.

One commentator suggested envisioning the work of the Security Council along two tracks: the short term and the long term. In the short term, it is of course necessary to respond to the immediate crises and threats arising at any given moment. That is the prime responsibility of the Council. However, it is also important to consider how its day-to-day work can contribute to long-term change

for the improvement of international peace and security. On the one hand, the Council's annual report mentions little or no movement on a number of persistent problems, including the Middle East, Cyprus and Western Sahara. Can the Council change the dynamics of such long-term conflicts? On the other hand, it adds real value on thematic issues, such as women and peace and security, children and armed conflict and the protection of civilians. The Council has made important contributions to the evolution of international values, norms and standards. These developments are most evident if the Council's work is seen over a period of 10 to 15 years. It is in these normative aspects of the Council's efforts that the influence of its non-permanent members has been most apparent.

Looking ahead, one speaker noted that, in the coming year, the Security Council will continue to address the issues of the Sudan, Somalia and the Middle East, on which there will be ample space for diplomatic and preventive efforts, challenging the Council to live up to its mandate. In the coming year, the Council should redefine its relationships with regional organizations, while working to strengthen the peacebuilding dimensions of its work, which will require closer collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission.

Another participant suggested that the future focus of the Security Council should be on the major issues threatening international peace and security. Two thirds of the issues on the Council agenda related to Africa. The Council should thus devote more time and resources to addressing situations in Africa, in coordination with the African Union and other regional and subregional organizations. The Council should engage in more preventive diplomacy and be prudent when applying sanctions or resorting to pressure. Furthermore, the Council should make every effort to take decisions by consensus. Unanimous decisions, such as the recent presidential statement on the Sudan (S/PRST/2010/24 of 16 November 2010), send the strongest signals.

Peacekeeping

One member wondered aloud how much of the Security Council's work is absorbed by peace operations. If one looks at peacekeeping from outside the United Nations, two things are striking: the proliferation of missions and their longevity. Some missions have been in place for 50 years, and this is a problem. One explanation is that the Council is most involved when conflicts emerge or re-emerge and is less involved in the long-term oversight of missions. The speaker welcomed the thematic debate on exit strategies and the suggestion that peacekeeping missions ought to exit earlier so as to make room for longer-term peacebuilding efforts. According to another participant, the Council had made significant progress in defining the transition and exit strategies of peacekeeping operations, including during the debate on this subject in February 2010.

On the issue of exit strategy, several participants noted that the Security Council has been confronted by a new trend of host countries requesting a premature pullout or modification of a mission's mandate. Such demands posed an unusual and uncomfortable situation for the Council, and one meriting further discussion of how to improve host-country relations. The related issue of relations with troop-contributing countries was raised by another speaker. Urging greater Council engagement with the troop-contributing countries, this participant

contended that more extensive engagement with those working in the field would lead to better, more informed decision-making in New York.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo had posed a long-standing test for the Security Council and its mandates, according to one of the speakers. It is a huge country that presents many extraordinary challenges for peacekeeping. Given these challenges, a higher level of understanding between actors is essential. The views of actors on the ground should be taken into account when decisions are being made and mandates considered in New York. Designing proper mandates is difficult enough, but securing the prerequisites for fully carrying out mandates often proves even more challenging. Paying for so many peacekeeping missions may also strain the system. Too often, according to another commentator, the Council decides upon operations without adequate financial estimates and without the proper military means to implement them.

One discussant suggested that there has been a lack of civil and military coordination in the Sudan. The military needs to have more of a voice at the United Nations. The United Nations is full of brave, courageous people, but there needs to be more communication between its Blue Helmets and its civilian staff. Concurring that there is a striking lack of military expertise at the Security Council, another participant commented that one hardly sees any Generals at the Council. In comparison to an organization such as NATO, the limited nature of United Nations procedures and mechanisms for handling military affairs is striking. For example, there is no chain of command. Though such deficits might have been acceptable during the days of traditional peacekeeping missions, such as in Cyprus, they are not compatible with overseeing such large and complex missions as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Another participant proposed that peacekeeping be the subject of a strategic debate in the Security Council. Offering support for the initiative proposed by the United Kingdom and France, the speaker suggested that there should be more strategic discussion within the Council about peacekeeping practices. Noting that the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations meets at the expert level, the participant recommended that it hold some meetings at the ambassadorial level, which should also include the participation of military advisers.

In crafting peacekeeping mandates, one speaker argued that Security Council-mandated missions should be based on a "standard" template entailing specific irreducible minimum tasks to be accomplished. Beyond this minimum, of course, every mandate should also be specifically tailored to the concrete realities on the ground. This participant contended that the monitoring of human rights should be one such standard provision of peacekeeping mandates. Without such a provision, missions could easily be undermined. On the other hand, several speakers lamented the tendency for peacekeeping mandates to become "Christmas trees" with too many tasks and too little prioritization.

Conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding

There was broad agreement that the maintenance of international peace and security necessarily involves conflict prevention, as underscored in Article 1 (1) of the Charter. However, one discussant reminded the workshop that the Security Council cannot do it alone. Regional organizations and the United Nations Secretariat, including the Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs,

are continuously engaged in conflict prevention. The role of the Council is to provide the mandate and to support those actors in the best position to achieve results and then to hold them accountable. For example, the Department of Political Affairs currently does not have the proper resources. In joining those calling for more emphasis on conflict prevention, one discussant noted that the Department had to call a pledging conference to mobilize funds for its prevention work. The Council must see to it that the Department has the proper support.

According to another participant, there is a need to build consensus on the issue of prevention, and to put it into practice. Contending that scarce resources would be most efficiently spent on investments in conflict prevention and resolution, the speaker called for a clear "paradigm shift" in this direction. Priority should be given to reading the warning signs and to putting concrete measures in place to avoid the outbreak of conflict, instead of waiting for crises requiring the expensive deployment of troops.

Another speaker suggested that there are some divergent views among the members of the Security Council on the scope and nature of its work. Was the Council designed to be a body that could consider only full-blown crises, or one that could also address potential crises while they are still possible to contain? Another member responded that there is no dispute over whether prevention is within the scope of the Council's work. However, there are distinct perspectives on how and when to go about it.

A speaker characterized the Security Council's systematic programme of work on the Sudan as a positive example of conflict prevention. Over the past six months, the Council had held frequent meetings on these matters and also undertook a mission there in October. This represented an intensive engagement and involved a lot of work. A similar commitment is needed in other cases. For example, nothing of similar scale has been undertaken with regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The participant acknowledged that, in some respects, the Sudan is a relatively straightforward case to address as it is already on the Council's agenda and two large missions have been deployed there. Most places in need of conflict prevention are not in the same position. According to the speaker, the Council should not restrict its discussions to situations that are on its formal agenda. The speaker suggested that the point of prevention is, in fact, to keep countries from becoming an item on the Council's agenda in the first place. To become more effective at conflict prevention, the Council should act in as agile and flexible a manner as possible.

Another member agreed that the Security Council is more capable of addressing issues that are already on its agenda. Addressing new situations inevitably leads to debates about whether they should be placed on the agenda. In that regard, a participant suggested that the Council make better use of the "other matters" item of its agenda as an opportunity to raise new issues. By adding an unpredictable element, Ambassadors would have an incentive to stay for the duration of Council sessions. According to several participants, most items considered by the Council stem from domestic issues, which raises all sorts of disputes about sovereignty and the proper role of the Council. While this remains a political hurdle, they agreed that at this point few matters brought to the Council take the form of a classic inter-State dispute threatening international peace and security.

Several speakers called the recent initiative to invite the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs to give the Security Council a *tour d'horizon* a useful contribution to conflict prevention. There was some disagreement, however, on the success of the initial briefing. One discussant commended the idea, but regretted that it did not generate debate. It would have been better, according to this speaker, if the briefing had focused on one or two topics. Another participant agreed that it would be more useful to receive an in-depth assessment of just a few "hot issues" from the Secretariat. A third speaker defended the utility of a briefing on all of the preventive initiatives being undertaken by the Department of Political Affairs, adding that perhaps it should be followed by a question-and-answer session. Another participant found the session to be of little value and would not repeat it.

More generally, however, members emphasized the importance of the interaction between the Secretariat and the Security Council, especially in the area of preventive diplomacy. As one participant put it, there is a limit to how far the Council can go on its own because of concerns about national sovereignty. Another discussant suggested that the Council regularly set aside time to obtain an overview of what the Secretariat is doing in the area of prevention and what challenges it is facing at that point.

Regardless of the improvements made at Headquarters, cautioned a speaker, weaknesses in the United Nations presence in the field pose a significant obstacle to conflict prevention that needs to be addressed. There are insufficient preventive mechanisms on the ground, such as early warning systems, and persistent gaps between peacekeeping mandates and resources. Other participants, however, pointed to the setting up of the United Nations Office for West Africa as a positive step towards conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the field.

Several participants commented on the importance of post-conflict peacebuilding in the work of the Security Council. As one speaker noted, the concept will continue to evolve and develop as, increasingly, it is considered in the drafting of mandates. To shorten interventions and avoid the return of conflict, peacekeeping operations should lay the groundwork for the peacebuilding mechanisms to follow. This substantive relationship, in the speaker's view, underscores the benefits of a high level of interaction between the Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. Despite frequent calls for a more organic relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, commented a second interlocutor, it has not happened in practice. Peacebuilding should be assigned a higher priority, both when mandates are crafted and when peacekeeping troops are withdrawn.

Partnerships with regional organizations

Many participants noted the importance of forging partnerships with regional organizations. One commented that coordination between the Security Council and regional organizations has improved in recent years, as illustrated by the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. However, it was pointed out that such partnerships could make the process of decision-making more difficult. The Council, observed a participant, operates on the basis of consensus, not only among its 15 members, but, increasingly, with regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union. Several members cited United Nations cooperation with ECOWAS on Guinea as an example of a particularly productive partnership.

One discussant noted that the Charter (Article 52 (2)) lays out a sequence of steps with regard to conflict prevention and resolution. Crises should be addressed first at the bilateral level, then at the regional level and only later at the level of the Security Council. The tendency to start such negotiations at the United Nations should therefore be avoided. According to another discussant, this suggests both that Council members should listen more attentively to messages from regional bodies and that the latter should be given more of an opportunity to complete their prevention efforts in cases where they are the first to address an emerging crisis.

It was pointed out that regional organizations often have special local knowledge and other comparative advantages that the Security Council should use whenever possible. Sometimes the United Nations should provide leadership, but often leadership should come from the regional organization. The key is to avoid rigid approaches in favour of open discussion and consensus-building.

There was extensive discussion of whether the United Nations should support African Union missions financially. It was contended that regional peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council, such as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), are often not provided sufficient financial and logistical support. Though agreeing that the United Nations does not provide enough support to the African Union, another discussant argued that if the United Nations provides financial support for an operation, then it should have some say over how it is run. It is legitimate, according to the speaker, to ask why the United Nations should financially support an operation over which it has no control. Other participants argued that the Council should support regional missions that help to carry the burden of maintaining international peace and security, especially when the regional mission is authorized by the Council. A discussant countered that there is general agreement among the permanent members of the Council that assessed contributions should not be used to fully fund regional operations. Assessed contributions, however, could be used to cover part of a mission's cost, as is the case in Darfur and Somalia.

One member spoke at length about AMISOM, the African Union force authorized by the United Nations. In the participant's view, the act of authorization suggests that the Security Council recognizes the mission as being important and deserving of adequate support. Should the African Union be unable to lead the mission effectively, it should be put under United Nations control. The support packages that have been provided have been insufficient. The reach of Somali-based pirates underscores the fact that the situation there is a clear threat to international peace and security. The Council, however, has given only minimal consideration to this very serious threat. Why has the Council devoted so much more attention to Chad, where the presence of United Nations troops has been controversial? The speaker called for a more even-handed approach and for clear, visible criteria to determine why assessed contributions should be used in one place and not another.

There were also calls for greater clarity in how the relationship between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council should work in practice. In that regard, the Union's request that the Council suspend the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court was discussed at length. There was some confusion about whether the Council had received a formal request from the African Union, although several participants confirmed that such a request had been received. Urging Council action on the

matter, one participant contended that the Council should pay close attention to requests from a regional group with special local knowledge. Another speaker countered that the Council has not addressed the petition because there is no unity on the issue. Some participants suggested that, even if the Council cannot take action on the request, some sort of response is warranted. One urged that this be done as soon as possible.

A participant made the case for a closer relationship with the European Union also. He suggested that the Security Council stop in Brussels on its next mission. Some other participants agreed. There is a lot of capacity at the European Union. For example, one discussant suggested that, in certain situations, the Union's rapid reaction force could make a critical contribution to United Nations peace operations.

Qualitative benchmarking: assessing the work of the Security Council

The first round-table session also featured a broad-ranging discussion of how to take stock of the work of the Security Council. A number of participants offered general assessments. As one put it, the Council is as exciting as it is frustrating. It can be a stage for mere performance on certain issues, but it can also be an indispensable body that tackles challenges no one else would venture to address. According to another member, the Council must always strive to improve its performance in order to meet the unending challenge of making itself "more accountable, more workable and more meaningful".

The issue of accountability was raised by a number of members. Greater accountability, in their view, is required to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of the work of the Security Council. In response, one member pointed to the absence of widely accepted qualitative benchmarks that could be used to assess its work, a subject raised in Professor Luck's background paper for the workshop. This participant proposed that the Council give Professor Luck the task of drafting a follow-up paper addressing how to develop a system of qualitative benchmarking. The Council could then meet in a "mini-retreat", perhaps an afternoon or dinner workshop, to discuss the results. Several participants agreed that this could be helpful, although the development of such measures would not be easy.

Session II
Working methods and subsidiary bodies

Moderator:

Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti
Permanent Representative of Brazil

Commentators:

Mr. William K. Grant
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the United States

Ambassador Raff Bukun-Olu Wole Onemola
Deputy Permanent Representative of Nigeria

Ambassador Nawaf Salam
Permanent Representative of Lebanon

During the second round-table session, participants discussed a wide range of issues relating to the Security Council's working methods and subsidiary bodies, including strategies for encouraging genuine debate in Council consultations, the role of thematic debates, the responsibilities of the President, cooperation with other United Nations organs, outreach to non-members of the Council, relationships with the media and Council missions. A recurring theme throughout the session was the need to balance transparency and inclusiveness in the Council's working methods with its overall efficiency and effectiveness.

Perspectives on the working methods of the Security Council

Participants noted the progress that has been made in improving working methods over the years and applauded the Security Council's ability to change, adapt and continually renew itself. Several speakers suggested that a continuous, incremental process of reform would best allow the Council to absorb changes without compromising productivity.

Several participants, noting the heavy workload and output of the Security Council, made suggestions for streamlining its work. One pointed out that much of what the Council does is a function of the calendar. For example, monthly, quarterly or biannual mandate reviews are scheduled long in advance, so the timing of such reviews rarely matches the course and pace of events on the ground. The speaker suggested that, at the beginning of each year, the Council examine the review periods for all items on the agenda with a view to rationalizing them and ensuring that their frequency reflects the relative importance of each item. Along similar lines, another speaker suggested that the Council, with the help of the Secretariat, undertake an annual assessment of output to determine whether there is any redundancy in presidential statements or resolutions and whether their texts can be shortened or clarified.

According to several speakers, incoming members are at a substantial disadvantage in having to begin their term on the Security Council without the same repository of knowledge on working methods as the permanent members. They may be less aware, for instance, when changes are instituted. One member cited adjustments in the pattern of consultations with regional groups as a case of a change they were unaware of until the issue was raised. Incoming members were advised to pay attention to working methods early on so as to be better placed to trace any changes that are made. In that regard, Japan's contributions in developing the working methods handbook were widely praised by the participants.

Subsidiary bodies

The work of the Security Council's subsidiary bodies and the role of the Chairs of the various committees were briefly discussed. One member spoke of the critical outreach role of committee Chairs, as they serve as the public face of the Council on the specific issue that each committee handles. More of this targeted outreach by individual members would be helpful. Several concerns were also voiced. One participant criticized the selection process for the Chairs of subsidiary bodies, urging more transparency in, and the democratization of, that process. The speaker also questioned whether there were any particular rules that would preclude

permanent members from chairing sanctions committees. Another speaker raised the issue of the working methods of the subsidiary bodies, questioning why they operate on the principle of consensus and unanimity rather than following the practice of the Council as a whole.

Outreach

There was a lively discussion of the Council's outreach activities, including to other States Members of the United Nations, contact groups, groups of friends, Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission's country-specific configurations, representatives of regional organizations, civil society and members of the press. A central theme was the need to balance transparency and inclusiveness with efficiency and effectiveness. Some contended that efficiency should not preclude openness, underscoring the utility of regular meetings with other groups. One participant spoke of the value, for instance, of regular outreach by Council members with their respective regional groups. Several speakers applauded the Council's growing willingness to allow access to non-members, including through the use of informal interactive dialogues. Others, however, felt that more needed to be done to give non-members a chance to be heard and have their views taken into account. Arria-formula meetings were also commended as useful outreach opportunities, although several participants suggested that they have become a little stale. At recent meetings, there had been a low level of Council representation and little genuine interaction with representatives of non-governmental organizations, who mainly read prepared statements. This observation led to a call for a new type of Arria meeting with a refreshed format.

According to several speakers, the Security Council has made greater strides in outreach than it is generally given credit for. Non-members, of course, have always been able to participate in the Council's formal open debates. Some participants cited opportunities for expanded outreach activity. For example, the Council's annual report to the General Assembly often leads to little more than a debate about the reform of the Council. It was suggested, therefore, that the President of the Assembly split the annual debate into two separate debates: one on Council reform and one on the actual work of the Council. The latter could provoke a more interactive exchange, in which the 15 Council members could receive, and subsequently discuss, candid feedback from the broader membership. This participant also lamented the usually sparse attendance at the President's briefings on the Council's monthly programme of work.

What non-members lack, claimed one speaker, is interaction on specific issues rather than participation in open debates. Perception matters, underscored one member, and the prevailing perception is that, when it comes to transparency, inclusiveness and accountability, the model is broken. Another participant countered that "the real business of the Security Council is not dealt with in the open". While Council proceedings have become more open, the speaker cautioned that openness should not become an end in itself at the risk of losing the advantages of having a place for confidential negotiations. Council consultations were conceived as private gatherings of Council members to discuss serious issues of which the Council is seized. The problem over the years has been a trend towards too much observation by outsiders. While the Council may be "the best show in town", that does not mean that it should be open to everyone. Along similar lines, other speakers raised

concerns about the confidentiality of consultations and, in particular, the prevalence of leaks.

One participant raised two issues related to inclusiveness. The first concerned whether the heads of the country-specific configurations of the Peacebuilding Commission should be permitted to speak in consultations. According to this speaker, the rule should be extended so that Chairs who are not members of the Council are allowed to participate in consultations on those situations. For small and medium-sized delegations, it can be useful to have experts from other countries provide backup on certain issues. While Council rules preclude non-nationals from entering the consultation room, there have been a few cases where a Council member has included non-nationals in its delegation.

Several members, while acknowledging that groups of friends can be very helpful in some situations, regretted that elected members often receive second-class status relative to countries belonging to such groups. Often, non-members of the Security Council who are members of groups of friends are better informed on particular issues than are some of the non-permanent members of the Council. One participant contended that the substantive quality of the work of groups of friends is usually enhanced when taken up by the Council as a whole.

Another participant raised the issue of the Security Council's relationship with the press, citing complaints over new rules put in place owing to work on the United Nations capital master plan and the temporary relocation of the Council Chamber. These concerns should be seen in the broader context of the press coverage of the United Nations and its overall public image. There has been a trend towards more erratic and less informed coverage, with fewer New York-based correspondents covering the United Nations in a sustained and knowledgeable way. In this speaker's view, the entire United Nations, including the Council, should do some hard thinking about its communications strategy to avoid a situation where only bad news gets reported. Responding to these concerns, another participant agreed that there is a collective interest in keeping high-quality journalists at the United Nations. The Council has asked the Secretariat to help journalists who are being charged a fee for the use of space under the new rules.

The task of speaking to the press about issues on which the Security Council is deeply divided could be quite challenging, noted one speaker. Another pointed out, however, that press statements by the President are generally written out and negotiated with all 15 members of the Council. Remarks to the press, on the other hand, may be more vague and generic, but sometimes they, too, have to be negotiated. In cases where the Council is divided, the President has no mandate to speak with the press other than in his or her national capacity.

Council consultations

There was a lively discussion of how to encourage genuine debate in Security Council consultations. In theory, these sessions are completely off the record, offering Council members a chance to engage in strategic and candid exchanges on issues of high priority and mutual concern. The reality, as described by many workshop participants, is strikingly different. Several underscored their disappointment with both the content and format of consultations, which tend to be neither interactive nor focused. According to several speakers, the common practice is for representatives to read statements, even in closed consultations, rather than to

engage in a real exchange of views. One participant estimated that 80 per cent of the statements delivered in consultations are the same as those delivered in the Chamber before the media and other observers. Another discussant contrasted the "sedate atmosphere" in the Council with that of the European Union, where 27 member States manage to engage in lively debate on a range of issues.

A series of specific ideas for making consultations more interactive and effective were voiced. For instance, several speakers commented that it would be helpful if members of the Security Council would agree to do away with prepared statements in consultations. A participant expressed doubt that this would actually foster a more interactive exchange, however, given concerns over confidentiality and the danger of leaks. Another pointed out that notes used in consultations are a means by which United Nations delegations communicate with capitals about what they plan to say in the Council and are not easily modified. If delegations found it necessary to read statements in consultations, it was suggested that they could at least abbreviate them.

One suggestion that received wide support was for the Security Council do away with the practice of maintaining a speakers' list during consultations. According to one member, when a recent session was opened without a list, "only those who had something to say spoke. We had fewer speeches. The discussion was short, fast-moving and informative, and then we moved on". One participant cautioned, however, that meetings would still need to be organized in a transparent way, making it clear why people were speaking in a particular order. Participants also spoke of the need to develop a culture within the Council in which not everyone feels compelled to speak on every issue in private consultations. This did not mean, one interlocutor pointed out, that Council members should address only issues in which they have a strong national interest. That would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the Council, whose 15 members share the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, even when and where their countries do not have a stake.

One member noted that the more interesting a consultation gets, the more it becomes a negotiation and the more important it is to keep it closed. If consultations are nothing but smaller versions of public meetings, then there is no need to conduct them in a closed chamber. If, however, Council members start using consultations to actually negotiate on substance, then it would become essential to keep those sessions confidential, as originally conceived. Incoming members were urged not to give up too quickly on the issue of fostering debate. Bad habits are difficult but not impossible to break, observed one participant, who recommended that incoming members develop strong allies on the Council who share their desire to see change.

Negotiating texts

One member pointed out that most text is negotiated at the level of experts, but even at the expert level, members of the Security Council are often negotiating "pre-cooked" text that has been worked out among the permanent members. As the participant put it, "if members of the Security Council want the outcome of meetings to be pre-cooked, then they should not complain that they are boring". Sometimes, the most interesting debate takes place at the procedural level. The speaker noted the contrast with the 1990s, when deep and substantive negotiations often took place at the ambassadorial level. Participants pointed to some recent

instances where the quality of the Council's work benefited from having discussions taken up to the level of Ambassador, notably on the resolutions on the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325 (2000) and on Western Sahara.

The tendency for outcome texts to be "pre-cooked" was also discussed in the context of the composition of the Security Council in 2011, which will include five non-permanent members who aspire to permanent membership. One participant wondered whether they would prefer to be part of the small group of Member States that "pre-cook" or to seek more inclusive discussion among all 15 members. Another contended that the discussion of inclusiveness with non-members should also apply to the internal business of the Council. A trend towards more inclusiveness in the drafting of resolutions would create a sense of work that is "collectively done and collectively owned", thereby leading to greater effectiveness and legitimacy.

Several participants spoke of the tendency of members of the Security Council to see consensus decisions as the most effective ones. Some commented on their surprise at how strong the tendency is to work for unity. In one case, the debate could have been resolved in 15 minutes had it been put to a vote, but the Council ended up in consultations for 17 hours in order to secure unanimous support for a particular decision. Though the veto is rarely exercised in terms of actual voting, "you know it's there", commented another speaker. In this discussant's view, the desire of Council members to find a common position is genuine, constructive and highly commendable.

Open debates: balancing transparency and effectiveness

The subject of open debates generated another lively discussion. As one participant noted, the introduction to the Security Council's 2009-2010 annual report stressed the positive impact achieved through thematic debates. This finding illustrates the remarkable progress that has been made over the past decade on a number of thematic issues, including protection of civilians, children in armed conflict and women and peace and security. Citing a growing tendency for incoming Presidents of the Council to plan a thematic debate during the month of their presidency, some speakers commented that it can be a struggle for elected members to find an issue on which to "leave their mark" in the form of a presidential statement. One participant cautioned against focusing too much energy on planning a "set piece" thematic debate and thereby neglecting the rest of the agenda. Another urged that open debates should be held only when it is absolutely necessary to hear from non-members. In the speaker's view, the fewer the debates, the more productive the Council.

Several speakers agreed that open debates are not living up to their potential. Too often they are long, repetitive and boring. At their best, open debates serve to inform the larger United Nations membership and to elicit feedback from them. The first goal is being reached more often than the second, however. To increase the interactivity of open debates, it was recommended that non-members speak first, that Council Ambassadors not leave after delivering a statement, that presidential statements not be read until the end of the session, that a five-minute rule for speakers be imposed and enforced and that open debates be limited to the morning session only. The goal should be to find a format that allows non-members to speak,

to be listened to and to genuinely contribute to the debate, not just to serve as a showcase.

The role of the President

Participants also discussed the role of the rotating presidency of the Security Council, making some specific suggestions on how incoming members might approach their presidency. One spoke of the essential outreach role played by the President, whether through briefings to the press and non-members or meetings with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly. According to another speaker, however, the United Nations system still does not give enough recognition to the President of the Council. The speaker added that some of the regional groups, for instance, did not seem interested in consulting with him during his presidency.

Participants underscored the need for each new President to take the role seriously and to think through the best way to approach it. One suggested, for instance, that the President host a monthly lunch for the members to discuss a single issue. This could serve as a brainstorming session on a particular question that the President would like to highlight, be it a specific conflict situation or a thematic issue. While the President has a certain degree of flexibility, one member pointed out that the Council's pace of work is very much dependent on the calendar. Relatively few events each month are under the President's discretion and thematic debates should be scheduled to fit the existing calendar. The speaker called for more debate on the monthly programme of work and for more strategic discussion among Council members of monthly priorities. The shortest Council sessions tend to be those where the programme of work is adopted, often with very little substantive discussion among permanent representatives. Another speaker asserted that some innovative approaches to using the presidency to shape the strategic direction of the Council had been taken in November 2010.

Council missions

There was a lively discussion of Security Council missions. Several participants pointed out that the Council's missions to countries on its agenda offer members an opportunity to meet actors, discuss issues, deliver messages and be exposed to a diversity of views. Thus, they provide opportunities for Council members both to educate themselves and to reach out to others, including a wide range of organizations and individuals, and not just to Government officials. Missions are therefore critical to the work of the Council, according to several speakers, despite their high cost and the burden they place on the host country. Missions to the Sudan, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were cited as being particularly useful in this regard.

Suggestions for improving missions were also made. For instance, it was argued that more could be done beforehand to ensure that members of the Security Council are prepared to deliver a clear message to the people of the country or countries visited. The Democratic Republic of the Congo was cited as a case in point. The Council could have been better prepared to respond to questions there about the withdrawal of peacekeeping forces, according to one participant. It was suggested that more use could be made of "mini-missions", in which a smaller group of perhaps five Council members could visit a country and subsequently

report to the rest of the membership. This would allow the Council to undertake missions to areas less often visited, such as Western Sahara or the Middle East. Another participant disagreed, countering that what makes Council missions so valuable is that all 15 members see the same thing and have an opportunity to interact and discuss what they have seen. This participant pointed out that the sense of being collectively informed by impressions on the ground would be lost if the Council resorted to "mini-missions" and added that "[h]aving a report read to you by a subset of colleagues is not the same as being on the ground and understanding first-hand what we are dealing with".

Some speakers called for a combination of full and mini-missions. In their view, when the Security Council is seized of a situation as critical to international peace and security as the Sudan or Afghanistan, all 15 members should go on the mission. In other cases, sending a smaller group may be sufficient. The benefits would include cost savings and added flexibility, as a smaller, more agile mission could afford to stay in country for a few more days without creating an undue burden. However, participants expressed divergent views about whether or how such a selection should be made. Would Timor-Leste, for example, merit a full or a mini Council mission? Several participants cautioned against giving the impression that some countries are "more important" than others or that the Council has double standards. A speaker recommended, therefore, that mission size be presented as a reflection of the seriousness of the challenges faced, not of the relative importance of the country in question. Another felt that all missions should be open to all members.

Several suggestions were voiced for enhancing the impact of Security Council missions, regardless of their size. One commentator saw a need for more military expertise and contact with the military during Council missions. Another regretted that the Council did not make better use of its missions to Afghanistan and the Sudan. Although the missions were well prepared, with good terms of reference and a clear message to convey, Council members failed to meet afterward to share assessments of what they had seen. There should be greater effort to draw collective lessons from these missions. Similarly, another member felt that informal, lessons-learned discussions should be standard practice following all Council missions.

Session III
Lessons learned: reflections of the class of 2010

Moderator:

Minister Konstantin Dolgov
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Commentators:

Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan
Permanent Representative of Turkey

Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting
Permanent Representative of Austria

Ambassador Tsuneo Nishida
Permanent Representative of Japan

Mr. Guillermo Puente
Counsellor and Political Coordinator
Permanent Mission of Mexico

Ambassador Ruhakana Rugunda
Permanent Representative of Uganda

The moderator opened the session by stating that each non-permanent member leaves its mark on the Security Council's work during its two-year tenure. Moreover, some members may return to the Council before too long. He thanked the outgoing class for its contributions to the activities and practices of the Council, commenting that while two years may not seem a long time to permanent members, it does represent a significant portion of the Council's activity. In his view, much had been accomplished over the previous two years and the outgoing non-permanent members should be commended for their solid performance.

Council dynamics and the relationship between permanent and non-permanent members

Several participants stressed the sense of unity of purpose that underlies the work of the diplomats on the Security Council. As one member put it, Council members understand that they have a shared responsibility to maintain international peace and security. At times, this collective sense of responsibility can outweigh national interests. Others agreed, commenting that the collegial atmosphere generally extends to permanent and non-permanent members alike. On most issues, coalitions of interest and values do not distinguish between permanent and non-permanent members. A speaker cited human rights, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, working methods and women and peace and security as examples. One outgoing member noted that, in any case, relatively few items on the Council agenda were central to his country's sense of immediate national interest and that this had made it easier for his country to contribute to consensus-building. Another speaker commented that it is possible to achieve unanimity in the Council on many issues, even controversial ones. This discussant also cited consensus-building as a particularly encouraging feature of the Council's work. The premium placed on consensus necessarily instils cooperative attitudes. One participant nevertheless questioned whether most diplomats on the Council regularly put global interests ahead of national ones. Too often, diplomats pursue narrow, parochial interests rather than trying to serve broader global concerns.

Several participants returned to the themes of transparency and inclusiveness. Permanent members, it was said, do not always treat non-permanent ones as equal partners in the work of the Security Council. There is a tendency, for example, for permanent members to prepare texts of resolutions and to discuss their substance with interested parties without consulting the non-permanent members. In such cases, the latter may receive texts as a fait accompli without having an opportunity to offer substantive input. The permanent members also tend to elect chairs of subsidiary bodies at their discretion, without sufficient consultation. Other speakers countered that the permanent members should not bear all the blame for the Council's lack of transparency and inclusiveness. The non-permanent members could be more proactive, take the initiative to engage constructively with the permanent members and ask relevant questions that challenge the latter's prerogatives. There are, after all, 10 non-permanent members compared with only

five permanent ones. Another participant added that newly elected members can also bring fresh energy and ideas to the Council.

In that spirit, a speaker encouraged incoming delegations to perceive the Security Council as an evolving institution whose norms and values change over time. Seen over a 5 to 10-year period, the evolving work of the Council becomes much more perceptible, even though its daily activities may seem predictable or even static at times. Non-permanent members can help to shape the course of change in the Council. Though some may not be great powers or large countries, non-permanent members can contribute wisdom and innovation to the Council's work. They can bring diverse perspectives, at times challenging positions taken by the permanent members, even on high-stakes issues, such as the Middle East or various peace operations in Africa. Several participants asserted that the divide between permanent and non-permanent members has been exaggerated, as issue lines do not respect such distinctions and categories.

Subsidiary bodies

Incoming members were urged to participate in those subsidiary organs of the Security Council, including working groups and sanctions committees, which best reflect their national policy interests and goals. One participant commented that chairing the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict reflected his country's interest in international law and international humanitarian law. Likewise, its commitment to disarmament led it to chair the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

According to several speakers, chairing subsidiary organs gives non-permanent members leadership opportunities and creates additional space for making meaningful contributions to the work of the Security Council. Through their leadership of subsidiary organs of the Council, new members could uphold standards of transparency, accountability and neutrality. Regarding the work of sanctions committees, one participant recommended that incoming members gain first-hand knowledge by travelling to sanctioned countries. Sanctions are not just a punitive measure; they can also be used as a lever to provide incentives for compliance with Council decisions.

Opportunities and challenges for new members

Outgoing members highlighted the unique challenges and opportunities that come with membership on the Security Council. Several commented on the sense of responsibility that comes with handling peace and security issues that other organs do not. While there is a tendency to accentuate the negative, the Council is capable of achieving much good, as its actions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Timor-Leste have demonstrated. Another outgoing member commented on how effectively and persuasively the body responded to the missile test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He saw the Council's handling of this situation as a model of constructive interaction among its members. The Council is often at its best when facing very difficult challenges.

One speaker cautioned the incoming members that two years is a condensed time frame in which to become an effective member of the Security Council. It takes six months alone to learn how the Council operates, particularly with regard to its procedures and working methods. An elected member then has only 18 months in

which to be productive. Nonetheless, much can be achieved by a non-permanent member within that time frame.

Another participant underscored the intensity of work that is experienced during the month that a member holds the presidency. Presidents of the Security Council must be prepared for surprises. When his country first served, it had to manage unexpected occurrences, such as the missile launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Sri Lankan crisis. During the month, scheduled debates were held on Haiti, children and armed conflict and the settlement of disputes. When it again assumed the presidency, it addressed the raid on the Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza, the crisis in Kyrgyzstan and the torpedoing of the *Cheonan*, a ship of the Republic of Korea. None of these events could have been anticipated.

Advice to newly elected members

Some speakers stressed the value of tapping into the non-governmental organization community for ideas and information. One reminded participants that non-permanent members had had difficulty accessing reliable information during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Fortunately, over the years, non-governmental organizations have helped to fill the information gap that existed at the time. For example, during the crisis in Sri Lanka in 2009, non-governmental organizations were an important source of information for the Security Council regarding events transpiring on the ground. Another participant commended the content of the website *Security Council Report* (see www.securitycouncilreport.org), which helped to facilitate the work of the speaker's mission. It is also important for non-permanent members to learn from and listen to the concerns of countries on the Council agenda. Elected members also can learn from one another and benefit from shared information and ideas.

Another common piece of advice was to make good use of the Secretariat. Those officials who are responsible for working with the Security Council were said to be of high calibre, to know their jobs well and to be willing to provide pertinent and timely information. To reinforce the point, one participant called the Secretariat an enormous asset to the Council, to the extent that non-permanent members could not function effectively without their assistance.

The importance of having a good team when entering the Security Council was also emphasized. One speaker stressed the importance of having a good legal adviser. Their status gives the permanent members special knowledge of the rules of procedure, which they use to their advantage and, at times, to the disadvantage of the non-permanent members. A good legal adviser can learn the Council's procedures and help his or her Ambassador to counterbalance this advantage. Legal advisers can also facilitate the work of non-permanent members when they chair subsidiary bodies, as this often entails substantial legal work. According to this speaker, the tendency for negotiations — and most of the work of the Council, for that matter — to be conducted at the expert level has underscored the need to have an excellent political coordinator and a strong group of experts.

The incoming members were advised that one area where a President of the Security Council can make his or her mark is in thematic debates. Some permanent members, however, have expressed concern that long thematic debates could take up a significant portion of the Council's time and distract it from other pressing work. According to one speaker, this challenge could be addressed by having new

members craft a thematic debate around an issue that the Council was already planning to discuss during the month of their presidency. Notwithstanding their original reluctance towards thematic debates, permanent members were now also increasingly organizing such debates during the month of their presidency. The one organized by China on cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations proved particularly useful.

United Nations S/2011/485

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 2 August 2011 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter, dated 22 July 2011, from the Chair of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, based on the Working Group's conclusions adopted on 22 June 2011 (S/AC.51/2011/5) (see annex).

(*Signed*) Hardeep Singh **Puri**
President of the Security Council

11-44195 (E) 040811

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Annex

At its 30th meeting, on 2 May 2011, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the second report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Central African Republic (S/2011/241), covering the period from December 2008 to December 2010. At its 31st meeting, on 22 June 2011, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in the Central African Republic (S/AC.51/2011/5).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group, approved by the Security Council, and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009) and 1998 (2011), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, to request you, through the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) and the United Nations country team, to strengthen the monitoring and reporting mechanism on violations and abuses against children through regular meetings of the Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and to promote the strengthening of information networks in order to ensure the fulfilment of reporting obligations to the Council. In this context, I would like to emphasize that a strengthened monitoring and reporting mechanism is necessary to ensure adequate follow-up to the implementation of the Secretary-General's recommendation that sufficient resources and capacity be dedicated to the mechanism and the conclusions of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in the Central African Republic, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005) and 1882 (2009). The Working Group would therefore like to request that you urge the Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting to strengthen its monitoring and reporting activities and to deploy resources and ensure sufficient capacity for this purpose, as necessary.

The Working Group wishes to note that the collaboration between the Government and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) in support of the effort of the Forces armées centrafricaines to protect civilians and regain control over conflict-affected areas is an important step towards protecting children and wishes to underline the concomitant need for the international community to support the Government in its efforts to professionalize and strengthen its defence and security forces, including its oversight mechanisms. The Working Group would like to encourage further collaboration between MICOPAX, BINUCA and relevant child protection actors on the training and capacity-building of Central African law enforcement and armed forces personnel, in the context of a holistic, nationally driven approach to security sector reform.

The Working Group further notes the release of children from the ranks of the Armée populaire pour la restauration de la république de la démocratie (APRD), and the latter's attempts to conclude an action plan with the United Nations, and requests that the United Nations country team renew its efforts to develop and implement an action plan with APRD to prevent the further recruitment and use of children with a view to de-listing APRD from the annexes to the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict.

The Working Group wishes to call upon United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to support the Government of the Central African Republic in the

development and implementation of long-term reintegration programmes for children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, taking into account the Paris Principles, which have been endorsed by the Government of the Central African Republic, in order to ensure that the separation of children from armed groups is maintained in the Central African Republic.

Lastly, the Working Group wishes to welcome the specific allocation of funds from the Peacebuilding Fund for child reintegration.

(*Signed*) Peter **Wittig**
Chair
Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2011/486

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 January 2011

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of China on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 27 January 2011 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations stating that Mr. Wu Wei, Mr. Tian Lin and Mr. Lu Haitian have been appointed alternate representatives of China on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

11-44207 (E) 040811

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United Nations A/65/925–S/2011/487

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
8 August 2011
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fifth session
Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-sixth year

Identical letters dated 3 August 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a complaint against Israeli enemy forces which, on 1 August 2011, violated Lebanese territorial integrity (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter issued as an official document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

11-44744 (E) 090811 100811

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Annex to the identical letters dated 3 August 2011 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

At precisely 6.30 on Monday, 1 August 2011, a patrol comprising eight troops of the Israeli occupation forces carrying a video camera crossed the Wazzani River (Blue Line) at UTM coordinates Q744307-N683260, in the vicinity of the Wazzani Falls resort on the river's west bank, penetrating some 15 metres into Lebanese territory.

Responding to this clear violation of Lebanese sovereignty and Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), the Lebanese Army fired warning shots inside Lebanese territory, but not towards the Israeli enemy patrol.

As a result of that action, the enemy troops crossed to the river's east bank. At 7.15 of that same day, having completed their withdrawal behind the technical fence, the Israeli enemy opened fire for 10 minutes using small and medium weapons and grenade launchers against Lebanese Army troops at the Maysat position in the Wazzani area and the surrounding area.

A Lebanese Army soldier was slightly injured by the Israeli enemy army gunfire, and the water tanks at the Lebanese Army position were hit by medium-calibre bullets.

This action is a clear violation of Lebanese sovereignty, Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

United Nations S/2011/488

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 August 2011

Original: English

Letter dated 5 August 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to my latest report to the Security Council concerning the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2011/406), I hereby request the Security Council to consider the renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is due to expire on 31 August 2011. In a letter dated 22 July 2011 addressed to me, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon requested that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of one year, without amendment.

UNIFIL continues to play a crucial role in ensuring peace and stability in southern Lebanon, as well as full respect for the Blue Line by both parties. In accordance with its mandate, UNIFIL continues to monitor the cessation of hostilities and assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons. UNIFIL also takes all necessary action within its capabilities to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind.

Cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continues to be essential for the implementation of the UNIFIL mandate. At the tripartite meeting held on 13 July 2011, the Lebanese Armed Forces reiterated the firm commitment of the Government of Lebanon to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and its continued cooperation with UNIFIL in this regard. This commitment was echoed by the Prime Minister, Najib Mikati, when he visited the UNIFIL area of operations on 16 July 2011, accompanied by the Minister of Defence and the Commander and senior generals of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces continue their joint operational activities, including an average of 13 counter-rocket-launching operations during each 24-hour period and six daily foot patrols, while operating 18 co-located checkpoints, 6 of which are on the Litani River. The two forces recently conducted several large-scale joint capability exercises on land and at sea.

The liaison and coordination arrangements of UNIFIL with the parties, including the tripartite mechanism, have facilitated a number of recent constructive and pragmatic measures and served to build trust.

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After a long impasse in the process of visibly marking the Blue Line due to a lack of consensus over contentious points, the parties responded positively to the most recent initiative of UNIFIL to proceed with the marking of non-contentious points. I am optimistic that after a long hiatus the marking process can now continue in earnest with the requisite support of mine action within the mission.

The parties have also agreed to discuss maritime security issues through the tripartite mechanism, with the possible inclusion of naval experts. UNIFIL will continue to work with both parties on the modalities for taking these discussions forward.

UNIFIL, after intensive engagement and discussions with both parties, finalized its proposal regarding the security arrangements to facilitate the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from northern Ghajar. On 25 June 2011, UNIFIL submitted its proposal to the parties for their formal adoption.

The overall attitude of the local population towards UNIFIL remains positive as it continues to carry out its operational activities, including up to 10,000 patrols per month throughout its area of operations. This notwithstanding, beyond the incidents reported to the Security Council through my periodic reports on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), several incidents of unfriendly behaviour and freedom of movement restrictions towards UNIFIL patrols and personnel occurred late in June 2011. Some of the incidents involved stone-throwing and the taking of United Nations property, such as cameras, geographical information systems, communication equipment and maps, from UNIFIL personnel by local civilians. UNIFIL strongly protested about the incidents to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The UNIFIL Force Commander has instructed UNIFIL troops to apply vigorously the rules of engagement in defence of themselves and their property. UNIFIL will continue to work closely with the Lebanese authorities, with the aim of minimizing the occurrence of such incidents.

The freedom of movement of UNIFIL and the security and safety of its personnel is integral to the effective execution of its tasks. The Security Council in its resolution 1773 (2007) urged all parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL, and to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel, including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel and by ensuring that UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement within its area of operations. The primary responsibility for ensuring freedom of movement to UNIFIL personnel in the area of operations lies with the Lebanese authorities.

I am encouraged by the engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the strategic dialogue process, to which I attach great importance. The strategic dialogue aims to carry out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets, and to set a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL and those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006). I hope that the pace of the strategic dialogue can be accelerated. The long-term objective of UNIFIL is to gradually transfer responsibilities currently carried out by the Force, on land and at sea, to the Lebanese Armed Forces, and have the Lebanese Armed Forces assume effective security control over the UNIFIL area of operations and Lebanese territorial waters, in line with resolution 1701 (2006).

The total number of military personnel, as at 15 July 2011, stands at 12,091. That number includes 11,135 UNIFIL ground troops deployed in two sectors, and 616 personnel serving in the Maritime Task Force. The UNIFIL civilian component numbers 354 international and 658 national staff.

I am grateful to the 36 troop-contributing countries that make up UNIFIL for their ongoing commitment. That commitment, coupled with the development of a strategic partnership with the Lebanese Armed Forces, has permitted the successful implementation of several key aspects of resolution 1701 (2006). However, as the UNIFIL mandate approaches its expiration date, it is clear that more work remains to be done.

I also would like to express my appreciation to the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, Major General Asarta, and to all the military and civilian personnel of UNIFIL, for the work they are carrying out in southern Lebanon in the service of peace.

Regarding the financial aspects of UNIFIL, by its resolution 65/303 the General Assembly appropriated to the Special Account for UNIFIL a total amount of US$ 545.5 million gross for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force beyond 31 August 2011, the cost of maintaining it will be limited to the amounts approved by the General Assembly.

As at 31 May 2011, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account amounted to $58 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at the same date amounted to $1,849.2 million. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full to clear all remaining arrears.

As at 14 July 2011, amounts owed to troop contributors totalled $13.1 million. Reimbursement of troop- and contingent-owned equipment costs have been made for the periods up to 31 May 2011 and 31 March 2011, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

With the above information in mind, I recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNIFIL for a further period of 12 months, until 31 August 2012.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

United Nations S/2011/489

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 March 2011

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Colombia on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 14 March 2011 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia stating that Mr. Miguel Camilo Ruiz Blanco, Mr. Juan José Quintana Aranguren and Mr. David Orlando Rodríguez Escandón have been appointed alternate representatives of Colombia on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

11-44314 (E) 050811

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